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ABSTRACT
This paper presents an analysis of a unique data set containing measures of the time devoted
to training during the first three months on a job and the productivity consequences of that training.
The major findings derived from the analysis of the data on new hire training may be summarized
as follows:
* Training investments in new hires are substantial even for jobs that are generally
considered unskilled.
* Formal training provided by specialized training personnel accounts for only a small
portion of the training received by new hires.
* Productivity rises substantially during the first year on the job.
* To fill jobs requiring a great deal of on-the-job training, employers prefer applicants
who have previous relevant work experience, who are well educated and who have
vocational training in a relevant field.
* Large establishments invest more in the training of their new hires than small and
medium sized establishments because (1) they have lower turnover, (2) they have
better access to capital markets, (3) the marginal product of an hour of training time
is higher at large establishments and (4) training lowers turnover more substantially
at large establishments.
The elasticity of demand for training is below unity.*
* When it is a binding constraint, the minimum wage lowers training investment by
roughly 17 percent during the first 3 months on the job and productivity growth
by 5 to 10 percent.
* Informal training by coworkers and training by watching others do the job appear
to have a higher benefit cost ratio than informal training by management.
* Estimates of rates of return to training derived from this data should be treated
with a great deal of caution. Nevertheless, marginal rates of return to training
appear to be quite high.
* The estimated benefit cost ratio for formal training depends on how the model is
specified. The productivity growth effects of formal training are bigger at large
establishments. Formal training has significantly larger effects on wage growth
than informal training. Formal rather than informal training significantly increases
the worker's propensity to quit.
Formal training's tendency to have larger effects on wage growth and quit rates than
informal training probably results from the fact that formal training is better signaled
to the labor market.
* The reported generality of training has no significant effects on the its marginal
productivity or on the effects of training on turnover.
* When training is reported to be highly general, training has a larger effect on wage
growth than when training is reported to be specific. Nevertheless, training that
is reported to be entirely general has much larger effects on productivity growth
than wage growth implying that the labor market treats this training as if it
were largely specific to the firm.
These results provide support for the view that workers do not pay the full costs of general
training and do not receive wage increases equal to the full productivity effects of general training.
They also lend support to our hypothesis that the outcomes of training, particularly informal
training, are poorly signaled to the labor market. Because other employers are unaware of its exact
character and unable to assess its quality prior to making hiring decisions, training that is
technically general often becomes effectively specific to the firm and employers choose to share the
costs and benefits of investments in general training. The second hypothesized reason why shared
financing of general training may be in the joint interest of employees and employers is the fact
that young workers are typically liquidity constrained while employers are not.
ON-THE-JOB TRAINING OF NEW HIRES
If the Germans had any secret weapon in the post-1973 economic difficulties, it is
the technical competence of their work force, which is in turn the product of their
apprenticeship system.
--Limprecht and Hayes, 1982, p.139.
I think that the Japanese education system is not very good employer training
is much more effective.
--¥utaka Kosai, President, Japan Center for Economic Research, 1989
The heart of this new [flexible] manufacturing landscape is the management of
manufacturing projects: selecting them, creating teams to work on them, and
managing workers' intellectual development.
--Ramchandran Jaikumar, 1986, p. 75.
A growing number of commentators are pointing to employer sponsored training as a
critical ingredient in a nation's competitiveness. American employers appear to devote less time
and resources to the training of entry level blue collar, clerical and service employees than
employers in Germany and Japan (Limprecht and Hayes 1982, Mincer and Higuchi 1988, Koike
1984, Noll et al 1984, Wiederhold-Fritz 1985). In the 1983 Current Population Survey, only 33
percent of workers with 1 to 5 years of tenure reported having received skill improvement training
from their current employer (Hollenbeck and Wilkie 1985). Analyzing 1982 NLS- ¥ outh data,
Parsons (1984) reports that only 34 to 40 percent of the young workers in clerical, operative,
service and laborer jobs reponed that it was "very true" that "the skills [I am] learning would be
valuable in getting a better job." The payoffs to getting jobs which offer training appear to be
very high, however. In Parson's study, having a high learning job rather than a no learning job
in 1979 increased a male youth's 1982 wage rate by 13.7 percent. While the 1980 job had no
such effect, the 1981 job raised wages by 7.2 percent when it was a high learning job rather than
a no learning job.
If the payoffs to such jobs are so substantial, why aren't such jobs more common? If one
were to put this question to an employer, he would point to the high turnover rates of youth as the
primary reason why he cannot afford to train new employees more intensely. For American
workers with less than one year of tenure, the probability of a separation in the next 12 months
is 59 percent. Since comparably defined turnover is only 20 percent in the United Kingdom and
24 percent in Japan, national differences in turnover could be a major reason for the low levels of
training investment in the US, if the employer's explanation is right (OECD, 1984, Table 33 and
34).
2The theory of on-the-job training says, however, that if training is general, turnover
propensities should not matter. The worker pays the full costs of the training and reaps the full
benefits whether or not there is subsequent turnover, so the decision to undertake training should
be independent of prospective turnover. The problem with the prediction that workers pay all of
the costs of general training is that analyses of large representative data sets generally fail to
confirm it. In Parson's (1985, table 7.6) study, when a youth reported that it was "very true" that
"the skills [I am] learning would be valuable in getting a better job", his job paid on average 2.4
to 14 percent more than when the above statement was "not at all true" even with an extensive set
of controls for schooling and academic achievement included in the model. Bishop and Kang
(1988) have conducted another test of this hypothesis in the 1984 follow up of the High School
and Beyond seniors by regressing the log of the deflated starting wage of the current or most recent
job on indicators of the receipt of employer sponsored training. Here again, the jobs offering some
training rather than none or which offer greater amounts of training paid higher starting wage rates
even when a whole array of human capital characteristics were controlled. For females the positive
effect of receiving training on the starting wage was statistically significant. Adding dummies for
occupation and industry did not change the results appreciably.
It could be argued, however, that these findings do not constitute a decisive refutation of
the proposition that workers pay all of the costs of general training. Hiring decision makers are
probably better at assessing the ability of job candidates than econometricians who are limited to
the information in the NLS or HSB data me. The positive association between wages and training
arises, it could be argued, because workers who are highly able (in ways not observed by the
analyst) are both paid more and also recruited for jobs that require large amounts of training.
Unobserved heterogeneity no doubt contributes to the positive association between training
and starting wage rates, but to transform a large negative structural relationship into a statistically
significant positive relationships just described, sorting of more able job applicants into high
training jobs would have to be very powerful indeed. If such a selection process were operating,
access to training should depend on ability factors that are visible to the analyst as well as on
factors that are not visible to the analyst. Yet models estimated by Parsons and by Bishop and
Kang failed to find large effects of ability proxies such as test scores, grades, and being a
disciplined student on the probability of receiving training.
One possible explanation of these anomalous findings is that the training is specific and
the employer is financing all of its costs. But standard models of the sharing of the costs of
specific training do not predict that employers pay all of its costs and some of the new revisionist
3theories--Salop and Salop's (1976) adverse selection theory--predict that employers pay none of the
costs of specific training. A specific training explanation of the these findings is particularly
perplexing when to all outward appearances the training is largely general.
Empirical tests of the theory of on-the-job training have been severely hampered by the
absence of data on the key theoretical constructs of the theoryngeneral training, specific training
and productivity growth. Data on wage growth and turnover have been used to test various
propositions of the theory, but defmitive results have been elusive because the large number of
unobservables result in there being at least two explanations for any given set of phenomena
(Garen, 1987). I hope in this paper to overcome some of the limitations of previous research by
analyzing the first large-scale data set to contain measures of the time devoted to training activities
during the first three months on the job, who does the training, the generality of training and the
productivity of the employees both during and after the receipt of training.
The paper is organized as follows. The first section describes how the data has been
collected and how the measures of worker productivity and of time devoted to new hire training
were constructed. Section 2 presents tabulations of this data by occupation, establishment size,
industry, previous relevant work experience, age and education. Section 3 contains a very simple
theory of training investment and then offers a multivariate analysis of the determinants of training
investment. Section 4 analyzes the effect of training on productivity growth of new hires focusing
on how the impacts of training depend on who provides the training, the size of the establishment
and the generality of the training. Section 5 examines the effect of training on wage growth during
the first 2 years on the job and then compares these wage rate effects with the productivity effects
estimated in section 4. Section 6 examines the effect of training on turnover and promotions. The
paper concludes with a summary of the major findings and a discussion of how the fmdings may
illuminate the causes of the lower levels of on-the-job training for new hires in the US than in
Germany and Japan.
I. DATA ON TRAINING AND PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH
The analysis is based on data from a survey of 3,412 employers sponsored by the National
Institute on Education (NIE) and the National Center for Research in Vocational Education
(NCRVE) conducted between February and June 1982. The survey was the second wave of a two-
wave longitudinal survey of employers from selected geographic areas across the country. The first
wave was funded by the U.S. Department of Labor to collect data on area labor market effects of
4the Employment Opponunity Pilot Projects (EOPP). The survey encompassed 10 EOPP pilot sites
and 18 comparison sites selected for their similarity to the pilot sites. The ES-202 lists of
companies paying unemployment insurance taxes provided the sample frame for the survey.
Because of the interest in low wage labor markets, the sample design specified that establishments
in industries with a relatively high proponion of low-wage workers be over sampled. The tax
paying units were stratified by the estimated number of low wage employees and the number of
establishments selected from each strata was roughly in proportion to the estimated number of low
wage workers at the establishments in that strata. Within strata the selection was random. The
survey was conducted over the phone and obtained a response rate of 75 percent.
The second wave attempted to interview all of the respondents in the fust-wave survey.
About 70 percent of the original respondents completed surveys for the second wave. Most of
the respondents were the owner/manager of small firms who were quite familiar with the
performance of each of the firm's employees. Seventy percent of the establishments had fewer
than 50 employees, and only 12 percent had more than 200 employees. In large organizations
the primary respondent was the person in charge of hiring, generally the personnel officer. If the
primary respondent was unable to answer questions about the training received by newly hired
workers in the sampled job, that pan of the interview was completed by talking to a supervisor or
someone else with line responsibility.
The employers who received the full questionnaire were asked to select "the last new
employee your company hired prior to August 1981 regardless of whether that person is still
employed by your company." Only 2594 employers had hired someone in the time frame
requested and these employers constitute the sample used in the study.
The respondent was asked to repon how much time typical new hires for this job spent
during the first three months of employment in four different kinds of training activities: (1)
watching others do the job rather than doing it themselves, (2) formal training programs, (3)
informal individualized training and extra supervision by management and line supervisors, and
(4) informal individualized training and extra supervision by co-workers. For the sample of firms
and jobs, the means for the typical worker were 47.3 hours watching others do the job (Tw), 10.7
hours for formal training programs (TF), 51 hours for informal training by management (Ts), 24.2
hours for informal training by co-workers (Tc). A copy of the relevant ponions of the
questionnaire is available from the author.
A training time index was constructed by fust valuing trainer and trainee time relative to
that of workers with two years of tenure in that job and then combining the time invested in
5training activities during the first three months on the job. The employers reported that workers
with two years of tenure in the job averaged between 22 and 50 percent (depending on occupation
and other worker characteristics) more productive than new hires during their first three months on
the job. This ratio was calculated for each job/worker category and used to place a relative value
on coworker time devoted to training.1 The management staff members who provide formal and
infonnal training were assumed to be paid 1.5 times the wage of coworkers. Fonnal training
involves four kinds of costs: development costs, facility costs, trainer time and trainee time.
Sometimes, it is one-on-one and sometimes it is done in groups but since most of the
establishments in this study are small, class size was probably small as well. Consequently, it was
assumed that when all the costs of fonnal training other than the trainee's time are lumped
together--development costs, training materials costs and the value of the trainer's time--they are
about 25 percent greater than the time costs of the trainee.2 When supervisors and coworkers are
giving informal training to a new employee, the trainee is almost invariably directly involved in a
production activity. Employers report that for infonnal training, the trainees are typically as
productive while being trained as they are when working alone (Hollenbeck and Smith 1984).
Consequently, infonnal training is assumed to involve only the investment of the trainer's time.
Thus in units of coworker time the value of trainer time is:
(1) Valued Trainer Time = Tc + 1.5*Ts + TF
In units of trainee time, the time the trainee spends not producing because of training activities
is:
(2) Trainee Time =Tw + TF
The total investment in training in trainee time units3 is:
(3) Total Training Investment = Tw + TF + (Tc + 1.5*Ts + TF)/RP.
where
RP = the productivity of the average new hire during the first 3 months divided by the
productivity of typical worker with two years' tenure
The arithmetic mean of this index is 209 hours, implying that the value of the time invested in
training a typical new employee in the first three months is about 40 percent of the output that
the trainee can produce working full-time during the first three months on the job.
The survey asked the employer (or in larger firms the immediate supervisor) to report on
productivity of the typical individual hired in the job after two weeks, during the next 11 weeks
6and at the end of two years at the firm. The rating was made on a "scale of zero to 100 where
100 equals the maximum productivity rating any of your employees in (NAME'S) position can
obtain and zero is absolutely no productivity by your employee." For the full data set at the mean
values of these indexes of reported productivity were 49.0 for the first two weeks, 64.6 for the next
11 weeks and 81.4 at the time of the interview. The questions asking for a rating of the
productivity of particular workers had a nonresponse rate of only 4.4 percent. Comparably defined
nonresponse rates for other questions were 8.2 percent for previous relevant experience, 3.2 percent
for age, 6.7 percent for education, 8.6 percent for time spent in informal training by supervisor, and
5.7 percent for a three-question sequence from which starting wage rate is calculated. The low-
nonresponse rate implies that our respondents felt that they were capable of making such judgments
and augur well for the quality of the data that results.
The interview questions about the productivity of recently hired employees do not measure
productivity in any absolute sense and therefore are not comparable across firms or across jobs in
a firm. Rather, they are intended as ratio scale indicatOrs of the relative productivity of a typical
(or a particular) worker at different points in their tenure at a firm. Under an assumption that these
productivity indexes are proportional transformations of true productivity plus a random error,
percentage differences in cell means of the productivity index will be unbiased estimators of
percentage differences in true productivity. If the variations in the productivity scores assigned by
supervisors exaggerate the proportionate variations in the true productivity, our estimates of
percentage differences in productivity between two workers will be biased upward. Even though
it is possible for a worker's true productivity to be negative, the scale was defined as having a
lower limit of zero. Floors and ceilings on a scale typically cause measurement errors to be
negatively correlated with the true value. If this is the case, then our estimates of percentage
differences in productivity between two workers will be biased downward. This latter type of bias
appears to be more likely than the former.
Further evidence that the proportionality assumption results in an understatement of
percentage differences in productivity between individual workers doing the same job comes from
comparing the coefficients of variation of productivity in this and other data sets. If pairs of
workers who are still at the firm are used to construct a coefficient of variation for this data set,
it averages .13 for sales clerks, clerical, service and blue collar workers. This estimate of the
coefficient of variation is smaller than the estimates of the coefficient of variation for yearly output
derived from analysis of objective ratio scale measures of output. These estimates were .35 for sales
clerks, .144 for semi-skilled blue collar workers, .28 in craft jobs, .164 for workers in routine
7clerical jobs and .278 in clerical jobs with decision making responsibilities (Hunter, Schmidt and
ludiesch 1988). This means that the estimates of the effect of training on productivity growth
reported in this paper are probably conservative. The fact that the employer is reporting on the
past productivity of particular employees may also generate biases in data but it is not clear how
estimates of productivity growth rates might be influenced by this problem.
Estimates were also prepared of the short run productivity penalty that results when new
workers are hired. This productivity penalty has two elements: the opportunity costs of trainer
time and the lower output of the trainee resulting from the worker's lack of familiarity with the
job and the time devoted to training. When expressed in terms of the opportunity cost of the
time of a worker with two years of tenure at the firm, the new hire penalty during the first three
months on the job is equal to:
(4)
(5)
Productivity Penalty = 1 - NP
NP = RPTP - Ie + 1.5*TS-i:-.IF
520 520
where
NP = productivity net of training cost of typical new hire
TP = time attempting to produce.
There is some uncertainty about the correct way to aggregate training time and productivity growth
effects, so three different estimates of the penalty are presented. The preferred "liberal" estimate
of the penalty assumes TP =520 - Tw - TF. This estimate assumes there is no double counting
of training costs: ie. that when the employers told us that new employees were 26 percent less
productive than workers with 2 years of tenure, they were not factOring intO that calculation the fact
that about 11 percent of the new hires time was spent in a training activity which produced
virtually no output (watching others and formal training). The conservative double counting
estimate of training costs assumes that TP = 520. In other words, it is assumed that the lower
productivity reported for new workers reflects in part that portion of their time devoted to formal
training and watching others do the work. The ultra conservative estimate of the penalty uses the
conservative double counting assumptions and also substitutes an average of RPand 1 for RP.
This estimate assumes that the reports of productivity growth made by respondent employers
exaggerates true productivity growth by a factor of 2.
8II. Estimates of the Magnitude of On-the-Job Training
in the First Three Months of a Job
We will begin by examining how the costs and consequences of initial on-the-job training
vary by occupation, industry, establishment size, and the previous relevant job experience, age, and
schooling of the employee. Multivariate models of the determinants of the length and intensity of
training are presented in section 3 of the paper.
Occupation
The impact of occupation on the amount of on-the-job training typically received by a new
employee is examined in Table 1. The first four rows of the table describe how the average
number of hours devoted to four distinct training activities during the first 3 months after being
hired varies by occupation. Even jobs that are thought to require little skill--service jobs--seem to
involved a considerable amount of training during the first 3 months: an average of 33 hours of
watching others, 5.7 hours of formal training, 35 hours of informal training by management and
17 hours of training by coworkers. Other occupations devoted considerably more time to training.
The distribution of training activities was similar across occupations, however. The typical trainee
spent most of his training time watching others do the job or being shown the job by a supervisor.
Roughly equal amounts of time were spent in each. Informal training by coworkers is next most
important and formal training provided by specialized training personnel accounted for an average
of only 5 to 10 percent of the time new hires were engaged in a training activities.
The fifth row of the table summarizes this information into an estimate of investment in
training during the first 3 months on the job. The index valued the time that managers, coworkers
and the trainee devote to training and expressed it in terms of hours of trainee time. Training
investment for service jobs was estimated to be 130 hours implying that the time invested in
training a typical newly hired service worker in the first 3 months was equal in value to about 25
percent (130/520) of that worker's potential productivity during that period. Investments in training
were considerably greater in other occupations. Retail (and service sector) sales and blue collar
jobs had a mean index of 185 to 200 hours respectively or 35 to 38 percent of the new employee's
potential productivity. Clerical jobs typically required the equivalent of about 235 hours of training
or about 45 percent of the new worker's potential output. Professional, managerial and non retail
sales workers required the equivalent of about 300 hours of on-the-job training or nearly 60 percent
of the new worker's potential output.
Sales
Profes- Mana- Not Retail Blue
ssional geral Retail Sales Clerical Collar Service
Hours Spent in Training in First 3 Months
Watching others do the job 60.0 65.0 82.8 39.2 50.4 48.1 32.7
Fonnal training programs 9.1 12.1 23.9 8.2 13.5 9.1 5.7
Infonnal training by management 76.6 80.4 71.8 48.5 54.6 49.3 35.1
Infonnal training by co-workers 31.8 23.0 33.9 23.9 26.2 26.8 16.7
Investment in Training Time 293 295 350 185 235 200 130
Weeks to become fully trained if
no previous experience 11.1 13.4 9.2 6.5 6.7 9.0 3.4
Increase in Reported Productivity (%)
Betw. first 2 wks. & next 10 wks. 28% 32% 50% 30% 40% 32% 28%
Betw. first 3 mo. & end of year 2 38% 33% 56% 25% 32% 23% 17%
New Hire Productivity Penality as a % of
Productivity of Wkr. with 2 Yrs. Tenure
Liberal assumptions 69% 69% 74% 51% 60% 50% 39%
Conservative assumptions 58% 56% 59% 44% 50% 43% 33%
Ultraconservative assumptions 43% 43% 43% 32% 37% 30% 23%
Increase in Real Wage in First 2 Yrs. (%) 5.0% 7.7% 22.6% 9.7% 11.5% 11.5% 3.7%
Number of cases 95 112 76 203 429 649 334
NOTE: Sample is limited to jobs for which all the necessary questions on wage rates, training time, and productivity were
answered.
TABLE 1
TRAINING AND PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH OF TYPICAL NEW EMPLOYEES
BY
OCCUPATION
9The sixth row of the table reports the geometric mean of the answers to the question "How
many weeks does it take for a new employee hired for this position to become fully trained and
qualified if he or she has no previous experience in this job, but has the necessary school-provided
training." Service jobs were reported to require an average of only 3 to 4 weeks of training, retail
sales and clerical jobs slightly under 7 weeks, and professional and managerial over 10 weeks.4
This training seemed to have the hoped-for result of increasing the productivity of the new
employees. The reported productivity of new employees increased quite rapidly (by roughly a
third) during the first month or so at the firm (see row 7). Despite the much greater time interval,
the percentage increases between the first quarter and the end of the second year (see row 8) were
smaller than those during the earlier period for blue collar, service, clerical and sales jobs. For
these occupations training investments and learning by doing seem to be large in the first few
months on the job but to diminish rapidly thereafter. In the higher level, managerial and
professional jobs, reported increases in productivity were larger between the third and 24th month
than in the first few months. This reflects the more prolonged training period for these
occupations. The occupations which devote the least time to training--the service occupations--
were the occupations with the smallest increase in productivity with tenure. The reported
productivity of service workers improved an average of 28 percent in the first month or so and a
further 17 percent in the next 21 months. Occupations for which a lot of time is devoted to
training in the first 3 months--professionals, clerical workers, managers and sale representatives
outside of retail and service industries--also seemed to have larger than average increases in
reported productivity as the worker gains in tenure. Clerical workers, for instance, were reported
to be improving their productivity by 40 percent in the first month or so and by a further 32
percent by the end of the second year on the job.
These very rapid rates of productivity growth suggest that the ratio of the productivity
increase to the costs of training (combining both worker and employer benefits and costs) may be
extremely high during the first months of employment. For clerical workers the total costs of
training during the first 3 months was 235 hours or .113 of a year's output by a worker whose
skill level is equal to that of a new employee. Since this figure is an upper bound on the
investment that contributed to the 40 percent gain during the first months on the job, the average
gross rate of return must have been above 354% per year (.40/.113). Since the intensity of training
investment falls with tenure at the firm, the cost of training investment during the next 21 months
cannot have exceeded .7875 (1.75*235/520) of a year's productivity by a newly hired worker.
This implies that the average gross rate of return to training investments during this 21 month
10
period exceeded 40% per year (.32/.7875). However, marginal gross rates of return to training
investment are lower and some of the gain in productivity results from learning by doing not
training. Multivariate cross section models of productivity growth which yield evidence on the
marginal productivity of training are presented in section 4 of the paper.
One of the consequences of the heavy investments in the training of new hires is that new
employees make significantly smaller contributions to the firm's current output than other workers
who have been with the firm for a couple of years or more. The time specifically devoted to
formal and informal training activities is not the only penalty incurred when a new employee is
hired. In most jobs, skills are developed and refined through practice. Learning by doing as it is
called may not actually involve spending time away from a directly productive activity. It is
costly, nevenheless, for the new worker is less productive than experienced workers. Thus the
productivity penalty when a new worker is hired has two components: training investments and
the lower productivity of the new worker and the time others devote to raising the new worker's
productivity.
Estimates of the shon run productivity penalty when a new worker is hired are presented
in row 9-11 of the table. These numbers provide a rough guide to the magnitude of the adjustment
costs associated with expansions carried out by hiring additional workers rather than by scheduling
extra hours. The other major component of adjustment costs--recruitment and selection costs--
tend to amount to only about 1 percent of a year's output by an experienced worker. The new hire
productivity penalty is much larger. During just the first 3 months, it was equivalent in value for
service workers to an average of about] months output by an experienced worker using
conservative assumptions about double counting. For professional, managerial and sales
representatives outside the retail and service sector, the penalty averaged about 1.65 months of
output by experienced occupants of the job. The large magnitude of these costs helps explain why
employers tend to hire new employees only when the increase in demand is perceived to be long
lasting.
Establishment Size
The relationship between establishment size and training was curvilinear (see Table 2).
The very largest and very smallest (10 or fewer employers) establishments invested the greatest
amount of time in training. Managers spent 59 hours training the new employee at the smallest
establishments and only 44 hours at establishments with 11 to 50 employees. The very smallest
establishment invested 43 percent of a new hire's potential productivity (224 hours) during the
TABLE 2
TRAINING AND PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH OF TYPICAL NEW EMPLOYEE
BY
ESTABLISHMENT SIZE
Number of Employees
0-10 11-50 51-200 201+
Hours Spent in Training
in First 3 Months
Watching others do the job 48.7 45.4 48.3 55.4
Formal training programs 11.8 7.4 9.2 17.0
Informal training by management 59.1 44.4 52.8 48.0
Informal training by coworkers 23.3 24.3 27.5 32.4
Investment in Training Time 224 1835 213 248
Weeks to become fully trained if
no previous experience 8.1 6.4 6.1 8.3
Increase in Reported
Productivity (%)
Betw. first 2 wks. & next 10 wks. 29% 33% 37% 49%
Betw. first 3 mos. & end of year 2 26% 24% 26% 34%
New Hire Productivity Penality as a % of
Productivity of Wkr with 2 Yrs. Tenure
Liberal assumptions 55% 50% 55% 61%
Conservative assumptions 46% 42% 46% 51%
Ultraconservative assumptions 34% 30% 34% 37%
Increase in Real Wage in
First 2 Yrs. (%) 12.1 7.3 8.7 9.6
Number of cases 792 678 296 123
NOTE: Sample is limited to jobs for which all the necessary questions on wage rates,
training time, and productivity were answered.
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fIrst 3 months in training while the next largest size category (11-50 employees) invested only 35
percent of the new hire's time. Those with more than 200 employees invested 48 percent of the
new hires time in training. The curvilinearity remains when other determinants of training are
controlled. Reflecting the pattern of investment in training, wage increases also exhibited a
curvilinear pattern being bigger in the very smallest and very largest establishments.
Reported increases in productivity did not, however, have a curvilinear pattern. Rather
there was a consistent tendency for the reported increases in productivity to be larger at the larger
establishments. The very smallest establishments reported a 29 percent productivity increase in the
first few months and a further 26 percent increase by the end of the second year. The largest
establishments reported a 49 percent increase in the first few months and a 34 percent increase
during the next 21 months. Such a dramatic contrast between the pattern of training investments
(input) and training outcomes is unusual. The relationship between training investment measured
in time units (line 5 of Tables 1 - 5) and returns to that investment, the increase in productivity
(line 7 or line 8) is described by:
(6) ~YR-P lQ = %t;? =AGRORj(S)(Total Training Investment)P1Q
where
AGRO~ is the average gross rate of return on dollars of investment in the training of
stayers at the jib establishment
Sj is the opportunity cost of training time at the t establishment
The lower percentage productivity growth to investment ratio of tiny establishments implies that
either they have a lower ARj or a lower Sjo It is unlikely that tiny establishments have lower
AGRORj for they have higher turnover and poorer access to capital markets. The probable
explanation of their small %t;? is a lower opportunity cost of time devoted to training (8). The
opportunity cost of managerial, coworker and trainee time devoted to informal training are likely
to be lower because small establishments are unable to spread the risk of stocastic demand as well
as larger establishments and so must typicaI1y operate with a higher ratio of capacity (staff on
hand) to demand (staff interacting with a customer or engaged in production). Scheduling of
training is also probably more flexible so training can be done during periods of slack work when
opportunity costs of trainer and trainee time are low.
TABLE 3
TRAINING AND PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH OF TYPICAL NEW EMPLOYEES
BY
PREVIOUS RELEVANT EXPERIENCE
Under More
1 1-3 3-5 5-10 Than 10
Typical New Employees None Year Years Years Years Years
Hours Spent in Training in First 3 Months
Watching others do the job 49.8 53.6 47.0 39.3 43.6 35.4
Fonnal training programs 11.0 11.2 8.2 11.4 11.1 4.9
Infonnal training by management 51.7 60.9 47.0 43.9 56.7 41.6
Infonnal training by coworkers 26.9 27.1 24.1 19.5 21.2 18.7
Investment in Training Time 220 242 185 171 203 149
Weeks to become fully trained if
no previous experience 6.3 7.0 6.7 9.1 8.6 11.1
Increase in Reported Productivity (%)
Betwn. first 2 wks. & nest 10 wks. 37% 35% 27% 29% 29% 29%
Betw. first 3 mos. & end of year 2 30% 29% 21% 19% 21% 21%
New Hire Productivity Penality as a % of
Productivity of Wkr with 2 Yrs. Tenure
Liberal assumptions 56% 60% 48% 48% 51% 45%
Conservative assumptions 47% 50% 40% 40% 43% 38%
Ultraconservative assumptions 34% 36% 29% 29% 32% 27%
Wage Rate
Current wage $ 4.66 5.05 5.62 6.91 6.42 7.90
Increase in real wage 13.9 10.8 8.2 4.7 4.7 0.0
Number of cases 699 382 404 124 193 96
NOTE: Sample is limited to jobs for which all the necessary questions on wage rates, training time, and productivity were
answered.
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Relevant Work Experience
The association between training investments that are typically made in new hires and
previous relevant experience of the individual actually hired is presented in Table 3. Jobs which
were filled by new hires with less than one year of previous relevant experience, typically involve
new hire training investment that was 45 percent of the new hire's potential productivity. For jobs
filled by new hires with 10 years of previous relevant experience training investment averaged 29
percent of potential productivity. This occured in the face of a strong tendency for the jobs
obtained by those with a great deal of relevant experience to be jobs that require a considerably
longer training period (see line 5). Clearly when employers filled jobs that require a great deal of
training if workers have no previous experience, they tended to give preference to candidates that
because of their previous experience were less costly to train. Note also that jobs filled by new
hires with greater previous relevant experience received substantially higher wage rates (see line
10).
The pattern of productivity and wage increase follow the pattern of investment. Those
with the least experience statted out considerably less productive but their productivity grew from
this lower base at a faster rate. Their wage rates start lower but rise faster. The new hires with
more than 10 years of previous experience, started out more productive and were paid a higher
wage. Their productivity rose but at a slower rate and they received no increase in their real
wage.6
Age
The association between the training normally given to new hires and the age of the new
hire is described in Table 4. The relationship was curvilinear. The 25 to 29 year old age group
appears to obtain jobs offering the greatest amount of training to typical new hires--235 hours.
Teenagers typically entered jobs requiring about 206 hours and those over forty typically entered
jobs requiring the least training--156 hours. Productivity growth and wage increases seem to
follow an irregular pattern that was roughly curvilinear with a peak in the 20-24 age group. The
average wage of a worker with 2 years of tenure in the firm was curvilinearly related to age with
the peak in the 30 to 39 age bracket.
Schooling: Type and Amount
The relationship between type and amount of schooling of the new hire and the on-the-
job training typically received by the typical occupant of the job is explored in Table 5.
TABLE 4
TRAINING AND PRODUCTIVITY OF TYPICAL NEW EMPLOYEES
BY AGE
Typical New Employees 16-19 20-24 25-29 30-39 40+
Hours Spent m Traming in FIrst 3 Months
Watching others do the job 43.7 52.6 52.0 45.5 38.9
Fonnal training programs 8.9 7.8 17.2 12.1 2.9
Infonnal training by management 54.7 52.8 58.4 45.9 43.3
Informal training by coworkers 23.8 29.4 23.1 23.3 20.4
Investment in Training Time 206 220 235 192 156
Weeks to become fully trained if
no previous experience 5.6 7.4 7.4 8.2 7.0
Increase in Reported Productivity (%)
Betwn. first 2 wks. & nest 10 wks. 33% 38% 30% 31% 28%
Betw. first 3 mos. & end of year 2 27% 29% 24% 23% 23%
New Hire Productivity Penality as a % of
Productivity of Wkr with 2 Yrs. Tenure
Liberal assumptions 53% 37% 56% 51% 46%
Conservative assumptions 45% 47% 46% 42% 39%
Ultraconservative assumptions 33% 34% 34% 32% 28%
Wage Rate
Current wage $4.12 5.25 5.84 6.20 5.80
Increase in real wage 11.8 12.1 9.3 7.5 3.6
Number of cases 346 582 409 332 229
NOTE: Sample is limited to jobs for which all the necessary questions on wage rates, training time, and productivity were
answered.
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One would expect schooling to be positively related to the rate at which a new hire can learn new
skills. This led to a hypothesis that employers would tend to select the better educated job
applicants for jobs that require a great deal of training. When the job being filled requires a great
deal of training if the new hire has no experience, we would also expect employers to attempt to
reduce training costs by giving preference to the graduates of relevant vocational training programs.
Both of these hypotheses were supported by the data. People with more schooling and
with relevant vocational training in school took jobs that have longer training periods for
inexperienced workers and that offer more intensive training during the first three months on the
job. High school drop outs with no vocational training typically got jobs in which training
investments in the first 3 months are only 22 percent of the new hire's potential productivity.
Graduating from high school raised the training that was typical for the job to 38 percent of the
new hire's potential productivity. Getting vocational training in high school raised training that
was tuypical for the job to 47 percent of potential productivity and vocational education at a 2
year college or technical institute raised it further to 52 percent. College graduates with a liberal
arts degree got jobs typically requiring only slightly more training during the first 3 months on the
job--54 percent of their potential productivity. College graduates who concentrated on vocational
subjects such as engineering or business entered jobs offering the greatest amount of on-the-job
training to typical new hires--56 percent of a much higher potential productivity.
Productivity growth with tenure seemed to be greatest in jobs normally filled by workers
with many years of schooling. While productivity increases for vocational program graduates with
12 or more years of schooling were respectable, graduates of non-vocational programs generally had
slightly higher rates of productivity increase despite their somewhat smaller amounts of training
investment. The productivity of vocational program graduates probably grew more slowly because
they started from a higher base. Evidence for their starting from a higher base is provided by the
higher wage rates they were able to command. Graduates of high school vocational programs
entered jobs with 10 percent higher wage rates than high school graduates that did not specialize.
For those with 13 to 15 years of schooling the wage premium of the jobs which hired vocational
graduates was 16 percent. College graduates with degrees in engineering, business or some other
vocational subject received a 41 percent higher wage than liberal arts graduates in this data set.
TABLE 5
TRAINING AND PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH OF TYPICAL NEW EMPLOYEES
BY
SCHOOLING
LT 12 12 13-15 16+
No No No No
Typical New Employees Voc Ed Voc Ed Voc Ed Voc Ed Voc Ed Voc Ed Voc Ed VocEd
Hours Spent In Tramm~ In FIrst 3 Months
Watching others do the job 30.2 25.6 56.4 45.6 61.3 49.0 84 67.1
Formal training programs 4.5 5.4 17.3 7.3 19.3 15.7 10.7 8.3
Informal training by management 40.0 31.6 53.4 54.0 62.4 51.7 68.7 68.9
Informal training by co-workers 23.8 17.3 31.3 23.5 26.4 23.8 27.1 23.9
Investment in Trainin~ Time 158 116 246 199 269 226.5 293 279
Weeks to become fully trained if
.. 6.5 4.2 9.7 6.3 11.1 7.3 12.4 11.3no preVIOUSexpenence
Increase in Reported Productivity (%)
Betw. first 2 wks. & next 10 wks. 33 24 28 35 34 38 35 37
Betw. first 3 mo. & end of year 2 33 17 28 24 28 30 33 41
New Hire Productivity Penality as a % of
Productivity of Wkr with 2 Yrs. Tenure
Liberal assumptions 51 36 58 52 63 58 68 70
Conservative assumptions 45 31 48 44 51 48 54 58
Ultraconservative assumptions 45 31 48 44 51 48 54 58
Wa~e Rate
Current wage $ 4.20 4.26 5.68 5.16 6.19 5.35 7.65 5.37
Increase in real wage 17.1 9.2 11.3 8.7 10.6 13.6 8.9 7.9
Number of cases 46 154 284 823 134 205 47 105
Note: Sample is limited to jobs for which all the necessary questions on wage rates, training time, and productivity were
answered.
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III. The Determinants of Training
The amount of training that is provided to typical new hires (Ij) is influenced by
characteristics of the job and the firm which influence the increase in worker productivity resulting
from training investments (X), the cost of capital to the firm and the worker (r), the rate of
obsolescence of skills (0), the separation rate (s), the share of training that is effectively specific
to the firm (I-g), and the opportunity cost of training time (8). Let us assume that the impact of
training investment on the hourly productivity of a worker can be represented by the following:
(7)
(8)
aP = ~(X )lJ J J where 0 < a < 1
~, a-I
~ = P (I) = af(X)lj
~Ij
The present discounted value of future productivity gains from training a worker who works Hj
hours per month is a perpetuity that is discounted at a rate reflecting the cost of capital,
obsolescence, the firm specificity of the skill and turnover. It can be expressed as:
00
PV(O = H*P) e-[Ij+Oj+(1-gj)Sj]t =J J J~(9)
Hpfl L~J'LUJ
r+o+ ( I-g.)s.J J ~ J
(10) ~Pv.
-J -
~l -J
HP'(I L
-J"
r+o+ (I-g.)s.J J ~ J
Since the marginal productivity of training declines as training increases, the level of training
investment is determined by the point at which the marginal cost of training investment (8) is
equal to the discounted value of its future marginal products (<<PV}«I).
, a-I
(11) 8j = -1Il (IJL - HJaf(X)lj]
rj+oj+(I-g)sj - rj+oj+(l-g)sj
Taking logs and solving for the level of investment, we have:
I(12) In(I) =
a-I [In[rj+Oj+(1-g)Sj]+ In(S) - In(H) - In(f(X) -In(a)]
Two different indicators of training investment are analyzed in this multivariate framework.
The answer to the question, "How many weeks does it take for a new employee hired for the
position to become fully trained and qualified if he or she has no previous experience in this job
but has the necessary school-provided training?" is the first indicator studied. It is a measure of
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the length of the training given new employees. The second is a measure of training intensity--
the value of the time devoted to training during the first 3 months of a worker's tenure at a firm.
Table 6 presents the results of the regressions predicting the logarithm of the two measures of
training investment. Multiplying a coefficient by 100 gives a rough estimate of the percentage
impact of a right-hand-side variable.
Both of the measures of training analyzed are indicators of the resource cost of training a
particular individual and not of the learning that has occurred as a result of the training. Most of
the determinants of training that are available in the data set are indicators of demand for and the
payoff to training or are variables that influence both the payoff and costs of training. Factors that
raise the payoff to training will increase both the cost of training (input) and the learning (output)
that results. When one looks across jobs, theory and previous empirical work predict that on-the-
job training is complementary with capital, complementary with the skill level of other workers in
the firm, and complementary with previous general and occupationally specific training of new
hires. All of these hypotheses are supported. Workers who use expensive machinery typically
receive a greater amount of training than other workers. The elasticity of response is .066 for
training intensity and .081 for weeks to become fully trained and qualified. The skill level of other
workers seems to have a positive effect on training. Evidence of this is the large positive effect
that the proportion of the work force in skilled occupations (white-collar or craft) has on training.
Jobs for which previous school-provided vocational training is important in selecting new
hires tend to involve much more training on-the-job than jobs for which previous school-provided
training is not important. Jobs that are considered to require an extensive general educational
background also typically involve longer periods of on-the-job training. These results imply that
students who take more years of schooling and who obtain vocational training typically fmd jobs
that offer greater on-the-job training as well. When jobs requiring a great deal of training are
filled, employers seem to be particularly interested in hiring applicants with a strong educational
background and relevant occupational training.
It is generally thought that very large establishments invest more training because the
discounted value of future payoffs to training is higher due to lower turnover (s), lower required
rates of return (r) (resulting from better access to capital markets) and lower marginal training
costs due to economies of scale (one trainer can teach many workers simultaneously). The results
presented in Table 2 suggests the following additional, hypotheses, regarding training investments
at establishments with fewer than 10 employees. New hires in very small establishments are
hypothesized to spend more time in training than new hires at medium sized establishments for two
Table 6
THE DETERMINANTS OF THE TRAINING OF THE TYPICAL NEW HIRE
Characteristics
Log Weeks to
Become Fully
Trained
Log Training
Intensity
In First
3 Months
Job Characteristics
Importance of voacational education
Specific vocational preparation
General educational requirements
Clerical
Sales
Retail Sales
Professional
Managerial
Service
Craft
Log cost of machine
Hours per weeks
Temporary job
Starting wage
Wage at or below legal minimum
Employer Characteristics
Log established employment
Log employment squared
Log ratio firm/establishment employment
Proportion skilled
Proportion craft
Proportion under 25
Proportion union
Sales growth last 2 years
Sales growth last 2 years if positive
Employment Growth
Past employment growth if positive
Market Characteristics
Log alter employers using same skills
Log labor market size
Standard error of estimate
R squared
Number of observations
.384***
-.020
.176**
-.257**
.046
.038
-.082
.073
-.332***
.136
.081***
.0161***
-.344***
.023
-.072
-.206**
.0273**
-.016
.452***
.302*
-.088
-.155
-.858***
.962***
-.035
-.306
-.016
.017
(3.72)
(.67)
(2.53)
(2.06)
(.27)
(.21)
(.43)
(.39)
(2.83)
(1.19)
(3.87)
(3.82)
(3.63)
(1.55)
(.85)
(2.19)
(2.17)
(.60)
(3.76)
(1.92)
(.70)
(1.18)
(2.70)
(2.70)
(.17)
(.99)
(.79)
(.62)
1.257
.182
1659
.522*** (5.58)
-.009 (.31)
.067 (1.37)
.250** (2.21)
.645*** (4.26)
-.344** (2.11)
.121 (.71)
.066 (.63)
.076 (.71)
.066 (.63)
.066*** (3.49)
.018*** (4.58)
-.295*** (3.54)
-.035*** (2.64)
-.170** (2.22)
-.317*** (3.72)
.049*** (4.25)
.038 (1.60)
.470*** (4.31)
-.127 (.89)
.237** (2.07)
-.114 (.96)
-.058 (.20)
.065 (.20)
-.041 (.22)
-.270 (.97)
-.049*** (2.63)
.042* (1.70)
1.14
.159
1659
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reasons. First, their employees must be taught a broader range of skills because very small
establishments have much more limited scope for division of labor. Secondly, the opponunity costs
of informal training time are lower because it can be scheduled during slack periods (e.g., when
no customers are in the store) and these periods are more frequent in very small establishments.
Multivariate analysis suppons the hypothesis that the size of an establishment exens a non-linear
effect on the time that is devoted to training. Large establishments devote more time to training
new employees than very small establishments, but they in turn devote more time than medium
sized establishments. The establishment size which has the minimum level of training is 25
employees for training intensity and 43 for length of training. Being a pan of a multi-
establishment firm has no significant impact on training time.
High rates of turnover reduce the payoff to training, so we would expect it to be associated
with lower levels of training investment per worker and to do so panicularly when training is
specific to the firm. Endogeneity prevents our using average rates of turnover as a regressor, but
variables measuring exogenous determinants of turnover are available. As predicted, temporary jobs
offer significantly less training. Models estimated in this data have found that turnover is higher
when there are many other local employers which make use of the same skills being taught in the
job. As predicted, such jobs offered less training.
Full-time jobs offer more training. If one assumes that hours worked per week are
exogenous (ie. hours effects but is not effected by the amount of training), the elasticity of demand
for training with respect to changes in its marginal payoff can be calculated from the coefficient
on weekly hours of the job. At the mean number of weekly hours in the sample of jobs, the
elasticity estimate is -.7 (significantly below 0 and significantly greater than -1), implying that the
demand for training with respect to its rental cost is inelastic. This means that a government
subsidy equal to 10 percent of the full marginal opponunity costs of training (or a reduction in
turnover or required rates of return which had an equivalent impact on rental cost) would increase
time devoted to the training of each new hire by 7 percent. An inelastic demand for training also
means that holding the job constant, a decrease in learning efficiency (eg. because the workers hired
are slow learners or the firm is not very effective in its training) simultaneously increases the time
devoted to training and reduces it's value added. The analysis fmds suppon for this prediction
because the employers who reponed that it was "difficult to find reliable unskilled workers" and
who hired many workers under the age of 25 did indeed spend significantly more time training new
hires than other firms.
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A number of economists have argued that because the minimum wage prevents workers
from agreeing to a low wage rate during training, it discourages on-the-job training of inexperienced
and unskilled workers (Hashimoto 1982, Leighton and Mincer 1981). Direct measures of OJT have
not been available, however, and the indirect tests of the hypothesis using wage growth outcomes
as a proxy for training can not be considered conclusive. The hypothesis implies that holding the
skill requirements of a job constant, there is a reversal in the sign of the relationship between wage
rates and training at the minimum wage. Above the minimum wage where wage rates are
unconstrained, lower wage rates are associated with more training. The negative effect of the
minimum wage on the intensity of entry level training should be visible in the jobs whose starting
wages are at or below the $3.35 minimum that prevailed in 1983.5 Many of these jobs will have
had to be redesigned to minimize the costs of initial training. This might be accomplished by
assigning the individual to a very narrow job and teaching only what is absolutely essential to
achieve acceptable performance in that job. Training in other tasks might be postponed and spread
over a longer period of time. These hypotheses were tested by including continuous measures of
the wage rate and a dummy variable for wage at or below the minimum in the training models.
As hypothesized, both of these variables had significant negative effects on training intensity and
no significant effects on the length of training. Similar models predicting productivity growth were
estimated (without including training investment on the right hand side) and the dummy for
minimum wage constraint had a significant negative effect (-10 percent) in the linear specification
and a small (-4.7 percent) non-significant negative effect in the logarithmic specification (Bishop
1985 Table 6.2).
IV. Impact of Training on Worker Productivity
New employees experience dramatic increases in productivity in the first 2 years of
employment at a firm. A part of this productivity increase is due to learning by doing and would
occur even if no training is provided. Formal and informal training is responsible for a major
ponion of the productivity growth, however. In this section, an effon will be made to determine
which training methods are most effective and to measure the rate of return to training investments.
The 1982 Employer Survey distinguished four different types of employer-provided training:
(1) formal training (provided by a training professional), (2) time spent watching others do the job,
(3) informal on-the-job training by supervisors, and (4) informal on-the-job training by co-workers.
The impact of training on productivity growth of typical new employees was estimated by
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regressing productivity growth during the first 2 years on the hours spent in each training activity,
the duration of training and a vector of control variables. Since diminishing returns are to be
expected, the square of the total cost of training was included in the model. Productivity growth
during the first 2 years was defined in 2 different ways: the log of the productivity growth ratio
and the change in productivity ratings on a 0-100 scale.6
The measures of time spent in specific training activities in the first 3 months on the job
are measures of training intensity rather than of aggregate training investment during the first 2
years on the job. Consequently, the reported required length of training--the log of the weeks
before a new employee becomes fully trained and qualified--was also included in the model. A
full set of controls for job, occupation, and firm characteristics was included in each model. With
the exception of the wage rate and minimum wage variables, the control variables used were
identical to the independent variables used in table 7. The specification used was the following:
(13) P2YR-P2WK= AX + a1lnL + a2TF+ a3Ts + a4Tc + asTw + ~T2 + u
where X = a vector of control variables listed in Table 3 (A is a vector of coefficients on
these control variables)
lnL = logarithm of the required length of training
TF = Hours devoted to formal training during the fIrst 3 months ('OOs).
Ts = Hours spent in informal training by supervisors during the first 3 months COOs).
Tc = Hours spent in informal training by coworkers during the fIrst 3 months ('OOs).
Tw = Hours spent training by watching others do the work during the fIrst 3 months('OOs).
T = Training Intensity is a weighted sum of the four different types of training where the
weight reflect the assumed costliness of this form of training.
T = 1.8*TF +1.5*Ts + Tc + .8*Tw.
P2YR= Productivity of the typical worker at the end of 2 years. In the linear
models P2YRis the productivity rating on the 0 to 100 scale divided by 80, the
mean productivity rating for workers with two years of tenure. In the logarithmic
models, P2YRis the logarithm of the productivity rating plus 5.
P2WK = Productivity of the typical worker during the fIrst 2 weeks. In the linear models P2WK
is the productivity rating on the 0 to 100 scale divided by 80, the mean productivity
rating for workers with two years of tenure. In the logarithmic models, P2WKis the
logarithm of the productivity rating plus 5.
The results are reported in Table 7. The regression with the logged productivity growth
as dependent variable is in column 1. Regressions predicting the linear measure of productivity
Productivity Growth Wage Growth (log)
Typical Typical Particular Typical Particular
Worker Worker Individual (2 Yrs) Individual
(log 2 Yrs.) (linear 2 Yrs.) Linear (1.1 Yrs)
(1.1 Yrs)
.068*** (6.43) .032*** (6.09) .025*** (4.36) .010*** (2.84) .008**(2.49)
.133*** (3.06) .046** (2.14) .048** (2.10) .043*** (3.13) .027**(2.05)
.130*** (3.85) .067*** (4.01) .043** (2.44) .020* (1.83) .017 (1.61)
.145*** (4.92) .077*** (5.30) .057*** (3.70) .001 (.15) -.002 (.25)
.149*** (7.37) .053*** (5.30) .046*** (4.32) .017** (2.54) .016** (2.55)
-.0085** (2.27) -.0049** (2.61) -.0050* (2.53) -.0011 (.92) -.OOIl (.97)
.597 .295 .308 .187 .178
.171 .129 .135 .198 .233
2Il6 2Il6 2002 1986 1963
Ln Length of Training
Hrs. of Training in first Quarter
Formal Training (lOO's)
Training by Supervisors (IOO's)
Training by Co-workers (IOO's)
Watching Others (100' s)
Training Intensity Squared (IO,OOO's)
Standard Error of Estimate
R2
Number of Observations
*
Significant at the 10% level (two-sided)
**
Significant at the 5% level (two-sided)
***
Significant at the 1% level (two-sided)
Table 7
Impact of Training on Wage and Productivity Growth
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growth are in columns 2 and 3. In both models, the coefficient on the square term is negative
and statistically significant indicating that there are diminishing returns to training intensity. When
the square of total training intensity is included in the model, all four of the linear terms for a
particular form of training have positive and statistically significant effects on productivity growth.
The effect of training intensity on productivity is quite large. An increase in any of the training
activities from 0 to 100 hours raises the worker's productivity by 13 to 15 percent in the
logarithmic models and by 4 to 7.7 percent (calculated at the mean level of productivity at the end
of two years) in the linear models. Clearly when training intensity is low, increases in its intensity
will produce large increases in worker productivity.
The total effect of training on productivity growth was calculated by multiplying the six
estimated coefficients by mean values of the corresponding variables. The calculated increase in
productivity was 22 percent (32 percent of the gain over the first two years) in the logarithmic
model and 12 percent of final levels of productivity (28 percent of the gain) in the linear model.
An alternative approach to estimating the impacts of training is to examine the productivity
growth of particular new hires. Column 3 of Table 7 presents results using productivity data on
a particular new hire rather than a typical new hire. Missing data reduces sample sizes by about
100. The variance of productivity growth across firms is larger when actual individuals are the
data rather than typical individuals. R squares of the models are slightly higher, however, because
characteristics of the worker and the worker's tenure at the time of the interview are included in
the structural model of productivity growth. In order to minimize simultaneity problems, the
training variables used in these models were for a typical new hire rather than for that particular
new hire. Comparisons of the coefficients in column 3 and 2 reveal that substituting data on
productivity growth outcomes of particular individuals for data on typical hires and controlling for
personal characteristics does not change the estimated effects of training.
The impacts of each type of training are remarkably similar. This was not anticipated
because some forms of training (e.g., formal training) have much higher hourly costs than others
(e.g., watching others do the work), and this was expected to result in the more expensive forms
of training having larger impacts on productivity than the cheaper forms. Measured in the units
of productivity of a worker with 2 years of tenure on the job, the hourly cost of learning by
watching others is .8. Formal training with a cost factor of 1.8 is the most expensive because
it requires the time of both the trainee and the trainer. The cost of informal training by supervisors
(a cost factor of 1.5) and by co-workers (cost factor of 1.0) lies between these two extremes
because the trainee is engaged in production and only the time of the supervisor and co-worker
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must be charged off as a cost of training. If one accepts these estimates of the relative costs of
different forms of training, the results imply that informal training by co-workers and training
yourself by watching others have a higher rate of return than informal training by supervisors.7
Factors fufluencing the Marginal Payoff to Training
Equation 11 implies that the impact of an additional hour of training on productivity growth,
P'(I), will be higher at companies with high required rates of return (r), high separation rates (Sj),
high skill obsolescence rates (~), high opponunity costs of training time (8), and low hours per
week (H). Since workers reap benefits from training even when there is a separation, training
investments should, in theory, be carried funher (ie. to a point where marginal benefits are lower)
when a job requires general skills rather than specific skills (ie. as g ~ 1). This suggests that an
hour of general training will typically have a smaller effect on productivity growth than an hour
of specific training. On the other hand, training that is general must be fmanced by the worker
not the firm. Since young entry level workers are generally liquidity constrained, the rates of
return required by workers are likely to be considerably higher than the rates of return required by
employers. This has the opposite implication. The inability of workers to finance general training
may substantially depress such investment and marginal payoffs to such investment may be very
high as a result. The relative imponance of these two effects can be tested by interacting training
intensity with a measure of the proponion of skills that are general (g).
Another job characteristic that is likely to influence the marginal product of an hour of
training is the size of the establishment. Large establishments are likely to have higher opportunity
costs of training time (8) and to be more efficient trainers (because of economies of scale). This
suggests that marginal impacts of training may be higher at large establishments than small
establishments. Formal training is considerably more common at large establishments and this
suggests that the marginal impact of formal training may be particularly high at these
establishments. To examine these issues, the models were respecified so as to allow for three-way
interactions between training intensity, generality of training, size, and the share of training that was
formal, watching others, and informal OJT by a co-worker. The specification used was the
following:
(14) P2YR-P2WK= BX + bjlnL + b2lnT + b3(lnT)2 + b4ElnT + hs.s.lnT + .!1;E.s.lnT+ b7glnT + u
where E = logarithm of (Establishment Employment/18.5)
~ = a vector of shares of training that are formal, watching others, and informal OIT by co-
workers. The excluded category is informal OJT by managers and supervisors.
g = the proportion of the skills learned useful at other firms.
.099*** (10.35) .098*** (10.15)
-.0024* (1.76) -.0023* (1.71)
.178 .178
.233 .238
1963 1963
In Training Weeks
In Training Intensity
in Tr. Intensity x Size
in Tr. Intensity x Share General
in Tr. Intensity x Share Formal
in Tr. Intensity x Share Co-Worker
in TT. Intensity x Share Watch
Tenure
Tenure Sq.
Standard Error of Estimate
R Square
Number of Observations
*
Significant at the 10% level
** Significant at the 5% level
***
Significant at the 1% level
Table 8
Impact of Training on Wage and Productivity Growth
of a Particular New Hire
Productivity Growth
(Log)
.053*** (4.55)
.115*** (9.35)
.083*** (2.58)
-.0078* (1.73)
.628
.164
2002
(two-sided)
(two-sided)
(two-sided)
.051*** (4.44)
.092*** (6.82)
.0099*** (4.11)
.0043 (.45)
.064*** (3.66)
.025 (1.51)
.038*** (2.70)
.104*** (3.20)
-.0094** (2.11)
.622
.181
2002
Wage Growth
(Log)
.0073** (2.19)
.015*** (4.26)
.0067* (1.93)
.0089*** (2.92)
-.0001 (.12)
.0029 (1.08)
.014*** (2.86)
-.001 (.23)
.007* (1.82)
Productivity Growth
(Linear)
.019*** (3.38)
.041
***
(5.46)
.0064*** (5.48)
.0018 (.40)
.011 (1.24)
.011 (1.37)
.009 (1.34)
.091
***
(5.78)
-.0088*** (4.07)
.303
.162
2002
Wage Growth
(Linear)
.0046 (.90)
.0064 (.96)
.0007 (.68)
.0073* (1.76)
.022*** (2.86)
-.004 (.52)
.017*** (2.71)
.098*** (6.31)
-.0045** (2.15)
.269
.126
1963
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The results of estimating various versions of equation 14 are reported in tables 8 and 9.
Table 8 reports the results of models predicting the productivity growth of a particular new hire
in which coefficients b3 and .l1;have been constrained to be zero. These models provide evidence
on the effect of the generality of training and establishment size on the marginal product of
training. The coefficient on the interaction between the generality of training and training intensity
is positive but very close to zero. The two effects discussed above appear to have canceled each
other out. It appears that the difficulties that workers face in financing general training are as
severe a barrier to investment in general training as high separation rates are to investments in
specific training.
The coefficient on size interacted with training is positive and highly significant in both
the logarithmic (column 2) and linear (column 5) model of productivity growth. The logarithmic
results imply that the elasticity of productivity with respect to training is 0.092 at establishments
with 18.5 employees and about 0.1156 for companies with 200 employees.8 The positive and
significant coefficient on interactions between intensity of training and the share that is part of a
formal training program or that is watching others do the work implies that these forms of training
have significantly larger effects on productivity growth than OJT by supervisors, the excluded
training category. Clearly, the earlier conclusion that marginal rates of return to watching others
and to co-worker OJT are higher than marginal rates of return to supervisor OJT is pretty robust
with respect to substantial changes in specification (alternative ways of defining the independent
variable, alternative ways of specifying the training variables and the use of productivity growth of
particular new hires rather than a typical new hire as the dependent variable). Findings regarding
the payoff to formal training, on the other hand, appear to depend upon specification.
Table 9 presents the results of testing the hypothesis that the size of the establishment
differentially effects the rate of return to specific types of training. The models presented in this
table included interactions of size with (share times log total training). While the coefficients on
these interactions are not significant in the particular worker models, interactions between formal
training and size are significant in the typical worker specifications. As hypothesized, the payoff
to formal training increases more rapidly with establishment size than the payoffs to other forms
of training. These results help explain why formal training programs are more common at large
companies than at small companies. In the linear typical worker specification, watching others do
the work seems to be a less effective learning technique at large companies than at smaller
companies. The coefficients on this variable in other specifications are negative but not
significantly different from zero.
Table 9
Impact of Training on Wage and Productivity Growth
Standard error of estimate
R2
Number of Observations
.591
.189
2116
.291
.156
2116
.178
.238
1963
* Significant at the 10% level (two-sided)
** Significant at the 5% level (two-sided)
*u Significant at the 1% level (two-sided)
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Past efforts to assess rates of return to OJT have focused on the wage payoff to worker
investments in training (Mincer 1989). This effort is fraught with difficulties, however, because
it is very difficult (a) to measure what employees [as opposed to employers] invest in training
and (b) to distinguish wage increases caused by training from wage increases caused by selective
turnover or the need to discourage shirking by back-loading compensation packages.9 The tOtal
returns to employer and employee investments (both general and firm specific:) have not been
evaluated because data on productivity effects was lacking. This study has generated tentative
estimates of both the opportunity costs and the productivity effects of training (general and specific,
worker and firm financed combined). It would appear, therefore, feasible to calculate marginal
gross rates of return (for general and specific training combined) necessary to cover the cost of
capital, losses due to turnover and obsolescence. The data was not collected for this purpose,
however, so there are gaps that can only be filled by some judicious assumptions. Consequently,
the estimates of marginal gross rates of return for each form of training that are reported in table
11 must be viewed as very tentative results which will hopefully be displaced shortly when better
data sets become available. Because the period for which training intensity is measured is much
shorter than the period over which productivity growth is measured, an assumption must be made
about the strength of the correlation between training intensity during the fIrSt 3 months and
training hours during the rest of the 2-year period. When the two year productivity gain of the
typical new hire is being analyzed, a unit increase in a training activity during the first 3 months
was assumed to be associated with a further 2-unit increase in that training activity during the rest
of the 2-year period.lO When the productivity gain during the first fourteen months for a particular
new hire is being analyzed, a unit increase in a training activity during the first 3 months was
assumed to be associated with a further 1.2 unit increase in that training activity during the
remainder of the first year on the job. Marginal GRORs are the ratio of the increment to
yearly productivity generated by a small increase training divided by the cost of increased training
(A detailed description is in the notes of Table 10).
The estimated marginal rates of return diminish as the intensity of training increases. The
mean training intensity for the first 3 months expressed in units of the time of trained workers is
148 hours. As intensity during the first 3 months rises from 100 hours to 300 hours (double the
mean), the marginal rate of return (ROR) for informal OJT by co-workers drops from 43-45 percent
to 25-32 percent in the two linear models for typical new hires presented in table 8. The linear
model's ROR drops from 38-43 percent to 25 percent for watching others and from 17-23 percent
to -1 to 10 percent percent for training by supervisors. The ROR of formal OJT is estimated to
Table 10
Sensitivity of Marginal Gross Rates of Return Estimates to Specification
Training Training
Formal by by Watching
Training ~ervisors Co-Workers Others
100 hrs 300 hrs 100 hrs 300 hrs 100 hrs 300 hrs 100 hrs 300 hrs
Table 8
Typical Individual
Linear 11%
-3% 23% 10% 45% 32% 38% 25%
Logarithmic 38% 15% 46% 24% 85% 63% 113% 90%
Particular Individual
Linear 15% -3% 17%
- 1% 43% 25% 43% 25%
Table 9
Typical Individual
Logarithmic 118% 54% 99% 48% 112% 53% 128% 58%
Linear 43% 16% 41% 16% 48% 18% 50% 18%
Particular Individual
Logarithmic 156% 68% 109% 52% 130% 59% 146% 64%
Linear 46% 16% 38% 13% 47% 16% 46% 16%
Estimates of the marginal gross rates of return to increases in the intensity of training at two different levels of
training intensity: a 100 hour investment during the fIrst quarter of the job and a 300 hour investment during
the first quarter on the job. Hourly cost factors are assumed to be 1.8 for formal training, 1.5 for training by
supervisors, 1.0 for training by coworkers, and 0.8 for watching others. When productivity growth over 2 years
for the typical individual is being modeled, duration adjusted cost factor is calculated by multiplying by the hourly
cost factor by 3 for the reasons given in the text. When productivity growth of a particular individual during the
fIrst 14 months is modeled, the duration adjusted cost factor is calculated by multiplying the hourly cost factor
by 2.2. The results presented in the first panel are calculated by taking the derivative of the estimated regression
equations reported in tables 4 with respect to hours of the specified kind of training, then multiplying by 2000,
the assumed number of hours worked in a year, and then dividing by the duration adjusted cost factor. As an
example of the calculation, the formula for formal OJT using the coefficients from the linear model in table 4
for training intensity (T) equal to 300 hours was as follows:
[(.00046 - .00000049*T*2*1.8)*2000 ] / [3*1.8] = -.0256 and the coworker training formula is:
[(.00077 - .00000049*T*2)*2000]/[3]= .3173. {Note that the coeffIcients must be divided by 100 and 10000 in
order to scale them in hours of training}. The GROR estimates presented in the second panel assume that the
firm has 18.5 employees (this zeros out the 5th and 7th terms of equation 3) and that all of the training received
is of the type indicated. For informal training by supervisors, the formula is:
(b2 + b/lnT*2)*2000/(T*duration factor) which is [(.003 +.0064*4.605*2)*2000] / (100*3) =.4176 at T=I00 for
the linear productivity growth model for typical workers. For training by watching others, the formula is (b2 +
bsw + b3*lnT*2)*2000/(T*duration factor) which is [(.003 + .013*Sw +.0064*4.605*2)*2000] / (100*3) =.504.
Obsolescence of skills and turnover mean that these cash flows do not have an infmite duration and should
therefore be compared to the sum of the interest rate, the obsolescence rate and the turnover rate times the
proportion of skills that are effectively specific to the firm.
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drop from 11-15 percent at 100 hours to -3 percent at 300 hours. Estimated rates of return for
particular workers are generally slightly higher than those calculated for the typical worker.
Estimated rates of return calculated from models based on logarithmic specifications are
considerably higher than those based on linear specifications of productivity growth. At the training
intensities that typically prevail during the first quarter, marginal rates of return seem to be rather
high. Since the impacts of training intensity were calculated while holding the length of training
fixed, these GRORs should be viewed as placing lower bounds on the true relationship.
It must be remembered, however, that these marginal GRORs include cash flows necessary
to compensate for tumover and obsolescence and are, therefore, not directly comparable to the real
rates of retum to schooling and financial assets that typically lie in the range from 5 to 10 percent.
If all training investments are specific to the firm and must, therefore, be written off if workers
leave and turnover is high, GRORs of 30 percent or more may be required to induce the firm to
invest in specific training. Lillard and Tan (1986) have estimated that training depreciates at 15 to
20 percent per year. This also would imply that equilibrium in the training market would likely
yield marginal GRORs of 30 percent or more. With all the uncertainties regarding the best
specification of the productivity growth model, measurement error in the training variables, the
specificity of the training, turnover rates, and the obsolescence rates, it is my view that robust
estimates of net rates of retum to on-the-job training are not now feasible and will not be feasible
until better data sets become available.
Results Using Instrumental Variables
The discussion so far has assumed that the causation runs from training to productivity
growth. It might be argued that when one is examining relationships for a typical worker that
firms hiring workers with very low initial productivity will fmd it profitable to provide more than
average amounts of training. Consequently, when initial productivity is not controlled, there may
be simultaneity bias in our models. A second econometric problem that is likely to be effecting
the results is errors in measuring training. Measurement error is probably biasing down our
estimates of the effect of training on productivity growth. To test for these biases, we estimated
the model of productivity growth using instrumented values of training rather than the actual
training investments.
The X variables used in estimating the models predicting investment in training in Table
6 were divided into two parts: those that theory predicts directly influence productivity growth and
those which influence the cost of training without directly affecting rates of productivity growth
Table 11
Comparison of OLS & Instrumental Variable Estimates
of the Impact of Training
Training Training Log Weeks of R2
Intensity Intensity Training
Productivi1Y.-Growth (lOO's hrs.) Squared
(Linear) (lO,OOO's)
OLS .112*** -.012*** .026*** .142
Typical Hire (9.3) (6.5) (4.9)
2SLS .333*** -.034* -.058* .076
(3.1) (1.8) (1.7)
Particular OLS .107*** -.014*** .017*** .152
New Hire (8.) (6.8) (3.2)
(1.2 Years)
2SLS .423*** -.058*** -.064* .115
(3.6) (2.8) (1.7)
Wage Growth
(Linear)
OLS .028*** -.0023* .0082** .197
Typical Hire (3.5) (1.8) (2.3)
2SLS .147* -.025* .010 .181
(1.9) (1.9) (4)
OLS .022*** -.0019 .0072** .232
Particular (2.8) (1.6) (2.1)
New Hire
(1.2 Years) 2SLS
-.009 -.0039 .048** .223
(.1) (2.1)
* Significant at the 10% level (two-sided)
** Significant at the 5% level (two-sided)
*** Significant at the 1% level (two-sided)
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conditional on training. The variables in this latter category were the number of alternative
employers, dummies for industry, the growth rate of employment, the growth rate of sales, the
number of employees at the establishment, the size of firm, the wage rate, a dummy for wage at
or below the minimum wage, a dummy for temporary job, dummies for no probationary period, the
log of length of the probationary period, dummies for not knowing if there is a probationary period,
a measure of the difficulty of firing a worker after the probationary period is ended, a measure of
the importance of seniority in determining who is laid off, and characteristics of the local labor
market. These variables were used as instruments for the training variables. This involves
maintaining the hypothesis that these variables influence the cost of training investments, and
therefore, the level and composition of training without influencing the rate at which new
employees learn. The X variables assumed to have direct impacts on productivity growth were
dummies for occupation, the specific vocational preparation (SVP), and the general educational
development (GED) that the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT) specified is necessary for the
job, percent of work force skilled, percent of work force who are crafts workers, the importance
of vocational education in selection, cost of machinery, unionization, hours worked per week, and
characteristics of the hires (i.e., percent under age 25), and an employer response that it is hard to
find reliable unskilled workers. When outcomes for particular individuals were being modeled, the
new hires' education, sex, and work experience were included in the structural model.
The results from a variety of specifications are reported in Table 11. In most cases,
estimating by intrumental variables (IV) rather than OLS has the effect of increasing the magnitude
of coefficients but reducing their statistical significance. The IV results also reverse the sign of the
coefficient on length of training. The fact that the IV estimations increase rather than reduces the
estimated effects of training intensity suggests that measurement error biases are more serious than
simultaneity bias and lends support to our general conclusion that marginal rates of return to
employer-provided training are very high.
v. Impact of Training on Wage Growth
The costs and benefits of investments in on-the-job training are shared by employer and
employee. This implies that jobs with a great deal of training will tend to have lower starting
wage rates than would otherwise be predicted and higher wage rates once the training is completed.
In other words, jobs with a heavy training component--either because it requires great skill or
because the people being hired for it are completely inexperienced--will have higher rates of wage
growth than other jobs. The more general the training the greater will be the share of training
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costs that is paid by the new employee and the greater will be the resulting rate of wage growth.
Since some types of training are more effective than others, some are more general than others and
some are more visible to other employers than others, one would expect different types of training
to have different effects on wage growth. Are the impacts of different types of training on wage
growth similar in pattern to their impacts on productivity growth? Or, is the pattern of wage
growth responses to different types of training more influenced by the generality and visibility of
the specific type of training?
These issues were addressed by estimating wage growth counterparts to the productivity
growth models presented in Tables 7, 8 and 9. The first dependent variable studied was the log
of the ratio of the firm's current wage for a worker with 2 years of tenure to the actual starting
wage of a person who had recently been hired for the position. Models predicting this variable
control for the effects of wage inflation by including the date of hire and it's square in the
specification. The results are presented in column 4 of Table 7 and column 5 of Table 9.
The second dependent variable is the log of the ratio of the current wage rate (or most
recent wage if there has been a separation) and the starting wage rate for a particular new
employee who was hired on average 14 months earlier. The models predicting this variable are
presented in column 5 of table 8, column 3 and 4 of Table 8 and column 6 of Table 9. The third
dependent variable is the difference in dollars and cents between the current (or most recent) wage
rate and the starting wage rate of a particular new hire. These models control tenure of the worker
on the date for which wages are reported. The results of predicting this measure of wage growth
are reported in column 6 of Table 8. All three models contain controls for the characteristics of
the new hire, the occupation, SVP, and OED of the job, percent of craft workers and percent of
skilled workers at the firm, the cost of machinery used in the job, unionization, importance of
vocational training in selection, percentage of the firm's work force under age 25, and reported
difficulty in fmding reliable unskilled workers.
The first conclusion that can be drawn from an examination of the wage growth results is
that training does have the hypothesized positive effect on wage growth. The effect is statistically
significant in almost all of the models. Comparisons of these coefficients with the estimates of the
impact of training on productivity growth, however, reveal that training has a much smaller impact
on wage growth than it has on productivity growth. In table 8, an increase in informal training
from 0 to 100 hours raises productivity of typical employees by 13 to 15 percent in the logarithmic
model and 5.3 to 7.7 percent in the linear model, but raises wage rates by only .1 to 2.0 percent.
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A doubling of the length of training raises productivity by 2.2 to 4.8 percent, but wage rates rise
only 0.7 percent.ll
In Table 8's logarithmic models for a panicular individual, doubling the length of training
increases productivity growth by 3.6 percent and increases wage growth by only .5 percent.
Doubling the intensity of training, increases productivity growth by 8 percent but raises wage
growth by only 1.1 percent. Productivity growth effects of training are also considerably greater
than the wage growth effects in the linear models reponed in column 5 and 6.
For fmdings such as these, the first explanation that comes to mind is that the training is
specific and the firm is paying most of its costs and reaping most of its benefits. Since skills are
thought to be more specific at large companies, the fact that the gap between the productivity and
wage effects of training is largest at big establishments provides further support for the skill
specificity explanation. The problem with this explanation, however, is that when employers were
asked whether the skills learned on their jobs were specific to the firm, most reported to the
contrary that the skills were useful at other firms. Funhermore, the generality of skills taught has
only very modest effects on the magnitude of the wage response to training. When training is done
by managers and the skills are reported to be entirely general, doubling training intensity raises
productivity by 6.7 percent but wages by only .8 percent in the logarithmic model reported in
columns 2 and 4 of Table 8. In the linear model in column 5 and 6 of Table 8, doubling training
raises productivity by 3 percent while increasing wage growth by only .96 percent. Analysis of
data on the typical new hire produces very similar findings. These results appear to contradict an
imponant prediction of Becker's theory--when training is general, its impact on wage growth should
equal or exceed its impact on productivity growth. Even though employers claim the skills they
are teaching are general, the labor market is not treating these skills as if they were general. How
can these puzzling results be explained?
One explanation of the phenomenon is that different firms require different mixes of general
skills. The firm that does the training concentrates on those skills it needs the most, some of
which may not be as highly valued by alternative employers. Skills that would be highly valued
by an alternative employer may not be taught because others on the staff already fulfill that
function. As a result, the package of general skills that workers develop are always more valuable
at the training firm than at other firms even when each individual skill is correctly perceived to be
useful elsewhere.
A second reason why the market behaves as if general skills are effectively specific to the
firm is that other employers will generally be ignorant of the exact character of a new hire's
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general skills and, consequently, will often not assign the worker to a job that puts the skills to
work. Even when a worker's next job makes use of the general skills learned, there is no
guarantee that new hires with better than average skills will be offered comparably higher entry
wages. These phenomena have the effect of transforming some skills which are technically general
into skills which are effectively specific to the firm. To the extent training is effectively specific,
wages will rise more slowly than productivity net of training cost (Bishop and Kang 1984, 1988).
Support for this signaling/visibility explanation of the gap between productivity and wage
rate effects of training comes from comparing the gaps for specific types of training. In table 8,
all forms of training had roughly equal effects on productivity growth. For wage growth, however,
formal training has much larger effects than other forms of training and OJT by co-workers has no
effect. Apparently, formal training is less specific to the job and more visible to the employee and
other employers, and thus workers are more willing to contribute to its costs. The importance of
OJT provided by co-workers is apparently underestimated by all concerned, the employee, the
supervisor, and other employers.
The third reason why general training masquerades as specific training is the
inability/unwillingness of most young workers (the ones who have the greatest need for general
training) to finance large amounts of general on-the-job training. Most of these workers are
liquidity constrained--that is they are unable to shift as much consumption from the future into
the present as they would like because they have neither assets which can be depleted nor access
to credit at reasonable terms.12 Half of households headed by someone under the age of 25 have
less than $746 in financial assets and 19 percent have no financial assets at all. Half of households
headed by someone between 25 and 34 have less than $1514 in financial assets and 13 percent
have none (Survey of Consumer Finances 1984). Subsidized or guaranteed student loans are not
available to finance on-the-job training and banks will not lend money for this purpose without
collateral. Borrowing against the equity in one's home is a possibility for some but only 34
percent of households with heads under the age of 35 own a home and many of the houses have
been owned for only a short while, so the equity that can be borrowed against is small. Even with
collateral, the loans available to individuals usually carry higher interest rates than those charged
businesses. Studies of the willingness of consumers to substitute consumption over time have all
concluded that the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is no higher than one and most studies
conclude it is .5 or below (Friend and Blume 1975; Hall 1988; Hubbard and Judd 1986). A
substitution elasticity of .5 implies that reducing a liquidity constrained worker's wage by one half
(in order to pay for general training) roughly quadruples the worker's marginal utility of
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consumption. Such a worker would be willing to give up four dollars of future income in return
for one dollar of current income. The liquidity constraint phenomenon has little effect on the wage
profile of jobs requiring no general training and which, therefore, have a flat productivity profile.
Where significant general training is occurring, however, it comes into play and may result in an
employment contract in which the employer shares the costs of general training (Glick and Feuer
1984; Feuer, Glick and Desai 1987).
VI. Impact of Training on Turnover
One would expect more productive workers to be more likely to be promoted and less likely
to be separated involuntarily. Consequently, the amount and nature of training that is typical at a
firm should influence turnover. To test this hypothesis, models were estimated predicting the
actual tenure, probability of a dismissal, probability of a quit and probability of a promotion of
particular new hires. Controls were included for the log of potential tenure and its square,
background characteristics of the individual worker, and characteristics of the job, the fIrm and the
local labor market.
The training variables were specified so as to allow a test of three hypotheses. The fIrst
hypothesis was that a policy of providing greater amounts of training lowers turnover and increases
the propensity to promote new hires. The second hypotheses was that this effect would be
strongest at the larger fIrms where training has larger effects on productivity. The third hypotheses
is that because formal training is more visible to the firm providing the training, the employee, and
other employers, it tends to raise the quit rate, reduce the dismissal rate, and raise the promotion
rate more than other forms of training.
The results are presented in Table 12. Establishment size was scaled as a ratio to its
geometric mean of 18.5 before being logged and interacted with training intensity. Consequently,
the coefficient on training intensity estimates the magnitude of the training intensity's impact on
turnover for establishments with about 19 workers. Surprisingly, there is no statistically significant
effects of either the length or intensity of training on expected tenure or rates of dismissal or
quitting at the small establishments that predominate in the sample. There is a statistically
signifIcant interaction between establishment size and training intensity, however. At larger
companies, a higher training intensity for typical workers is associated with longer tenure. At small
companies, the reverse association exists. Effects are very small, however. A doubling of training
investment raises expected tenure by only 1.3 percent at a company with 200 employees and lowers
expected tenure by only 1.7 percent at a company with 2 employees. In these results, we have still
Table 12
IMPACT OF TRAINING ON
TURNOVER AND PROMOTIONS
Log Involuntary
Training Tenure Separation Quit Promotion
Log Length of Training .011 .004 -.007 .004
(1.1) ( .6) (1.0) ( .4)
Log Intensity of Training -.002 .004 -.006 .040***
(.1) (.6) (.7) (3.8)
Interaction of Training
Intensity With:
Establishment size .009* -.004 -.005 .010**
(1.8) (1.3) (1.2) (2.1)
Share formal training .014 -.011 .017* -.001
(1.1) (1.3) (1.8) (.1)
Share OJT by co-worker .004 -.006 .004 -.015
(.3) (.8) (.4) (1.2)
Share watching others -.007 .009 -.005 -.010
(.6) (1.3) (.6) (.9)
R Squared .658 .050 .049 .108
* Significant at the 10% level (two-sided)
** Significant at the 5% level (two-sided)
*** Significant at the 1% level (two-sided)
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another reason why large companies typically make greater investments in training than small
companies.
The hypotheses that formal training would have larger effects on turnover than other forms
of training is supported by the data. For quit rates, there is a statistically significant difference
between the impact of formal and informal types of training. Point estimates imply that informal
training reduces the quit rate and that formal training increases the quit rate. This lends support
to our hypotheses that formal training is both more useful at other firms and more visible to other
employers and that informal training is either in skills specific to the firm or invisible to other
employers.
The training provided to typical new hires has a much more significant impact on
promotions than it has on turnover. At a company with 19 employees doubling the amount of
training raises promotion propensities by 3 percentage points. There is a significant interaction
with establishment size. If the establishment has 200 employees, doubling training intensity raises
promotion propensities by 4.6 percentage points.
VII. Implications of Empirical Findings
for the Hypothesis that
Americans Under-Invest in On-The-Job Training
The major findings derived from the analysis of the data on new hire training may be
summarized as follows:
* Training investments in new hires are substantial even for jobs that are generally
considered unskilled.
* Formal training provided by specialized training personnel accounts for only a small
portion of the training received by new hires.
* Productivity rises substantially during the first year on the job.
* To fill jobs requiring a great deal of on-the-job training, employers prefer applicants
who have previous relevant work experience, who are well educated and who have
vocational training in a relevant field.
* Large establishments invest more in the training of their new hires than small and
medium sized establishments because (1) they have lower turnover, (2) they have
better access to capital markets, (3) the marginal product of an hour of training time
is higher at large establishments and (4) training lowers turnover more substantially
at large establishments.
The elasticity of demand for training is below unity.*
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* When it is a binding constraint, the minimum wage lowers training investment by
roughly 17 percent during the first 3 months on the job and productivity growth
by 5 to 10 percent.
* Informal training by coworkers and training by watching others do the job appear
to have a higher benefit cost ratio than informal training by management.
* Estimates of rates of return to training derived from this data should be treated
with a great deal of caution. Nevertheless, marginal rates of return to training
appear to be quite high.
* The estimated benefit cost ratio for formal training depends on how the model is
specified. The productivity growth effects of formal training are bigger at large
establishments. Formal training has significantly larger effects on wage growth
than informal training. Formal rather than informal training significantly increases
the worker's propensity to quit. Formal training's tendency to have larger effects
on wage growth and quit rates than informal training probably results from
the fact that formal training is better signaled to the labor market.
* The reported generality of training has no significant effects on its marginal
productivity or on the effects of training on turnover.
* When training is reported to be highly general, training has a larger effect on wage
growth than when training is reported to be specific. Nevertheless, training that
is reported to be entirely general has much larger effects on productivity growth
than wage growth implying that the labor market treats this training as if it
were at least partly specific to the firm.
These results provide support for the view that workers do not pay the full costs of general
training and do not receive wage increases equal to the full productivity effects of general training.
They also lend support to our hypothesis that the outcomes of training, particularly informal
training, are poorly signaled to the labor market. Because other employers are unaware of its exact
character and unable to assess its quality prior to making hiring decisions, training that is
technically general often becomes effectively specific to the firm and employers choose to share the
costs and benefits of investments in general training rsee Bishop and Kang (1984, 1988) for a
formal proof of this statement]. The second hypothesized reason why shared financing of general
training may be in the joint interest of employees and employers is the fact that young workers are
typically liquidity constrained while employers are not.
If these conclusions are true, turnover becomes a more important determinant of training
investments than previously thought. In the standard model, turnover propensities influence the
amount of specific training supplied but not the amount of general training undertaken. However,
if employers finance some of the costs of general training (or general and specific training are joint
products of the same training activity), worker's with high turnover propensities are likely to find
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it hard to obtain jobs that offer general as well as specific training. For those with less than one
year of tenure, the probability of staying at the firm for at least 12 additional months is over 80
percent in the United Kingdom, 76 percent in Japan but only 41 percent in the US (OECD, 1984,
Table 33 and 34). The high rates of turnover in America, then, help explain why investments in
both specific and general on-the-job training of new hires are lower in this country than in Japan
and Germany.
One important reason why turnover is so high in the US youth labor market is job shopping
and tryout hiring. When the match is first arranged, both the employer and the job seeker are
poorly informed about each other, so they spend the first months learning about each other and,
if they do not like what they discover, they terminate the relationship. If they knew more about
each other going into the match, there would be fewer surprises, fewer quits and fewer dismissals.
There are good reasons why tryout hiring is so prevalent in the US. There are major institutional
barriers to the free flow of information about job applicants--such as EEO testing guidelines, the
failure of high schools to send out transcripts and the threat of law suits if bad recommendations
are given--that do not exist in other countries. German and Japanese employers are much more
careful in their selection of blue collar and clerical employees than American employers
(Rosenbaum and Kariya 1987; Koenig 1987).
A second reason why turnover is higher in the US is that there are fewer legal and
contractual obstacles to layoffs in the US (Sengenberger 1985; Flanagan 1986).13 Thirdly, turnover
appears to be less costly for young American workers than for young German and young Japanese
workers. It has already been noted that specific training is more extensive in Japan, and the loss
of these investments is a disincentive to turnover. Transition costs also discourage turnover (Bishop
and Kang 1988) and there is reason to believe that there may be differences across countries in the
magnitude of these transition costs. In some countries, quitting or being laid off does serious
damage to the worker's reputation and the likelihood of finding another good job. The best
Japanese employers hire straight out of high school and are said to discriminate against those with
work experience. The reverse prevails in the US. Quitting appears to be much less stigmatizing
in the US than in Japan particularly for young workers.
In Germany, the apprenticeships have a three month probationary period during which
either party may opt out of the contract without serious consequences. Nevertheless, only 5 percent
of apprentices change employers during this period. An apprentice who quits his apprenticeship
after the probationary period will find it very difficult to get another one. As a result, about 95
percent of those who finish the first 3 months of their apprenticeship stick with it for the full three
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years and pass the performance exam that comes at the end. While, apprentices are not subject to
layoff when there is slack work, journeymen are. Who is laid off is often based on job
performance not seniority, so being laid off is more stigmatizing than it is in the US. To protect
themselves from this stigma, German workers bargain for employment contracts which reduce the
probability of layoffs by front loading compensation and mandating severance pay.
The result is lower turnover, a higher payoff to employer investments in specific and
general training, greater training investment and, as a result, strong productivity growth. Mincer
and Higuchi (1988) correctly point out that causation also runs in the opposite direction--high rates
of investment and technological progress increase the returns to training and raise the disincentives
for turnover.
An examination of equations 11 and 12 suggest a number of additional reasons for the
relatively low level of on-the-job training investment in the United States. The most obvious
explanation of the heavier investment in training by Japanese corporations is the very low costs
of capital they face. The fact that Japanese companies operating in the US spend more on training
than American companies in the same industry provides further support for this hypothesis (Mincer
and Higuchi 1988). A second possible explanation is that Japanese and German workers are better
educated and consequently faster learners (ie. P'(I) is higher in Japan). A third explanation is the
minimum wage which prevents unskilled American workers from offering to pay for general
training by accepting a sub-minimum wage during the training period.
A fourth reason for the contrast is the lack of a strong apprenticeship system in the US.
The standardized curriculums and the proficiency exam at the end of the apprenticeship mean that
the quality and nature of the training is well signaled to employers in Germany, Switzerland and
Austria. The result is that the worker can count on benefiting from doing a good job in their
apprenticeship even if the training employer does not keep them on. Since the future payoff is
certain, German apprentices are willing to start out at a wage that is only about one-quarter of the
wage they will be able to command at the end of the apprenticeship. If the apprentices were
adults, they could not afford to accept so Iowa wage. They are, however, teenagers who because
they live at home are heavily subsidized by their parents. Consequently, the liquidity constraint
that is such a barrier to heavy investments in general training in the US is much less of a problem
in Germany.
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ENDNOTES
1. The use of the ratio to estimate the relative productivity implicitly involves an assumption
that the productivity reports received from employers are a proportional transformation of
true productivity plus a random error. The unknown factor of proportionality can be
different for every job, every firm and every respondent but a single respondent is assumed
to use the same proportionality factor when answering our questions. If alternatively it were
assumed that these reports exaggerate the rate of growth of productivity with tenure by a
factor of 2, estimates of training investment would be 7 to 15 percent lower. Comparisons
across occupations or of new hires with different qualifications would not change
appreciably.
2. When many workers can be trained simultaneously, the fixed costs of developing the
training package and hiring a trainer are spread over a larger number of trainees. This
means that the average hourly cost of formal training is generally smaller at large companies
than small companies. For the small companies included in this study was assumed that
the cost factor for formal training was roughly 1.8 times the value of an experienced
coworker's time. For establishments with more than 200 employees, cost factors for formal
training would be much lower, possibly between 1.2 and 1.4.
3. The index was constructed under an assumption that the four training activities were
mutually exclusive. This implies that if the sum of the hours devoted to individual activities
is greater than 520, that a reporting error has occurred which overstates investment in
training. In the few cases where the sum of hours devoted to training exceeded 520, the
training time index was adjusted downward by the ratio of 520 to the sum of the hours
reported for individual activities. This procedure reduces the mean of the index by about
10 percent. The cost of the trainer and amortization of training package development costs
was assumed to be two-thirds of the foregone productivity of a supervisor, since formal
training often spreads fixed costs over more than one trainee. Thus 1.8 = (2/3) 1.5 + .8.
4. If the arithmetic mean were being reported these numbers would be considerably larger.
Nevertheless these numbers seem low especially for professional and managerial jobs.
5. Many of the new hires who were paid less than $3.35/hr were hired before the increase
in the minimum to $3.35/hr.
6. Because a number of employers reported that productivity was zero during the first 2 weeks
on the job, 5 was added to all productivity index values before the productivity growth
ratio was calculated.
7. Measurement error may bias these coefficients in a way that makes these [mdings stronger.
Our respondent (generally a boss, supervisor, or personnel manager) probably had better
knowledge of time spent in formal training and informal training by supervisors than of time
spent in other forms of training. This should have resulted in the coefficients on these
forms of training having a smaller measurement error bias than the coefficients on informal
training by co-workers and time spent watching others. Thus, correcting for measurement
error might raise the coefficients on these last two forms of training by more than it raises
the coefficients on formal training.
8. Using a single logarithm of training hours variable to predict the productivity growth ratio,
Barron, Black and Loewenstein (1989) obtained an elasticity of .11 (using the same metric
as that used in the linear model in Table 9). The major differences between the two
analyses are: (a) Barron et. al. predict productivity growth from the first 3 months average
9.
to the end of 2nd year while this analysis predicts productivity growth from the fIrst 2
weeks to the end of the 2nd year, and (b) length of training was not controlled by Barron
et. al. whereas it is controlled in this analysis. It is this second difference that probably
accounts for the somewhat larger elasticities in their analysis. The logarithmic model yields
elasticities of the productivity level of .148 with respect to training intensity and .06 with
respect to length of training.
Mincer (1989), for example, attempts to calculate a rate of return to the worker's investment
in training by dividing the percentage wage increase by estimates of the cost of training
(generally running between .2 and .25 of a years productivity) that are based on the fraction
of a years time that worker's report they spend in training. This fraction tells us something
about the combined employer and employee costs of training not the costs incurred by the
trainee. In fact, in the Lillard and Tan (1986 Table 4.3 and 4.5) earnings regression which
Mincer uses to estimate the depreciation rate for training, trainees experienced no earnings
reduction during the year in which training was received. Similar results have been obtained
in other data sets (Parsons 1985, Bishop and Kang 1988, Barron, Black and Loewenstein
1989). While the positive association between current training and current earnings is
probably due to the omission of unobserved worker quality, it strains credibility that the true
earnings sacrifIce is 20-25 percent of a years wages when multivariate models that include
schooling, test scores, actual work experience and a host of other variables indicate a
positive effect of current training on current wages. The worker's investment in training
is probably much smaller so the wage ROR for worker investments in training is probably
much higher than the numbers estimated by Mincer.
10. If training intensity in each of the other seven quarters were identical to the fIrst quarter's
training intensity, the cost multiplier would be seven rather than two. The correct multiplier
is significantly less than seven because training investments in the later period are not
perfectly correlated with training investments in the fIrst quarter and because most employers
report the training period to be less than 6 months. Given these facts, the two for one ratio
is an assumption that magnifies the cost of the reported differences in training intensity quite
dramatically and reduces calculated rates of return by a factor of three.
11. As with productivity growth, estimation using instrumental variables increases the size of
coefficients (probably because of the correction for measurement error in training) but
decreases their statistical significance. In the IV models wage effects of training are much
larger than the productivity effects.
12. Becker clearly recognized the existence of liquidity constraints in his 1962 paper. "Since
employer specifIc skills are part of the intangible assets or good will of firms and can be
offered as collateral along with tangible assets, capital would be more readily available for
specifIc than for general investments (pA2)." He did not, however, explicitly analyze how
such constraints might effect the predictions of his model.
13. Flanagan argues that the increasing number of wrongful discharge cases being won by
plaintiffs with large jury awards has significantly raised the risks and costs of dismissing
workers in the US. This may be the case for senior employees but such cases are seldom
brought when the dismissal comes in the first two years of employment. Rates of turnover
of workers with more than 5 years of tenure do not appear to be appreciably higher in the
US than in Europe (OECD 1984)
